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Sexual harassment is prohibited under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. Although sexual 
harassment is illegal, some workers are sexu-
ally harassed on the job. For example, a 1994 
survey of federal employees by the US Merit 
Systems Protection Board found that 44 percent 
of women and 19 percent of men had experi-
enced unwanted sexual attention on the job in 
the preceding two years. Sexual harassment 
claims comprise a large component of charges 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).
Sexual harassment is widely viewed as an 
instrument of power and intimidation rather 
than primarily as an expression of sexual desire, 
and such harassing behavior may cause victims 
as well as their coworkers to be less productive. 
Indeed, sexual harassment is a form of employ-
ment discrimination precisely because it alters 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment” and interferes unreasonably with the abil-
ity of those in the protected classes to perform 
their jobs. Sexual harassment may lead to lower 
pay if harassment reduces worker productivity 
by, for instance, inducing inefficient turnover, 
increasing absenteeism, and generally wasting 
work time as workers attempt to avoid interac-
tion with harassers. 
An alternative hypothesis is that, similar to 
jobs in which workers face a high risk of death 
or disabling injury, workplace sexual harass-
ment is an undesirable working condition that 
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may  generate a compensating pay differential. 
There are, of course, clear differences between 
job risks and sexual harassment. Job risks are 
usually a consequence of the technology in the 
industry, whereas sexual harassment arises from 
illegal personal behavior. Yet similar to job risks, 
sexual harassment is costly for firms to eliminate, 
which may result in sexually harassing behavior 
occurring in some workplace environments. 
Thus, the direction of the relation between 
sexual harassment and wages is not predictable 
a priori. While pay differentials on the basis of 
sex and on job risks and other working condi-
tions have been widely studied by economists, 
sexual harassment has received little attention 
within the economics literature.1
This paper provides evidence of the rela-
tion between the risk of sexual harassment and 
wages. While one approach to detecting the 
effect on wages of sexual harassment would 
be to estimate wage equations controlling for 
whether an individual reports that he or she had 
been sexually harassed, sexual harassment on 
the job is unlikely to be exogenous with respect 
to wages, and it is difficult to identify appropri-
ate variables that would allow instrumental vari-
ables estimation. In addition, there are almost 
no data reporting information on sexual harass-
ment as well as wages and other determinants 
of wages. 
To avoid these problems, I adopt the conven-
tional hedonic wage methodology used to esti-
mate compensating wage differentials for risk 
of injury or death. Specifically, using data on 
individual charges filed with the EEOC (which 
1 Examples of papers in the economics literature analyz-
ing sexual harassment include Heather Antecol and Deborah 
Cobb-Clark (2006), examining the effect of sexual harass-
ment on job satisfaction and quit intentions; Kaushik Basu 
(2003), providing a theoretical analysis of how laws prohib-
iting sexual harassment can improve welfare for all workers; 
and David N. Laband and Bernard F. Lentz (1998), exam-
ining the effect of sexual harassment on lawyers’ pay, job 
satisfaction, and quit intentions. 
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I obtained under the Freedom of Information 
Act), I calculate gender-specific estimates of the 
risk of sexual harassment by industry and age 
group. 
Matching these risk measures to data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), I estimate 
wage equations controlling for the risk of sexual 
harassment and for other determinants of wages, 
including occupation and the percent female in 
the worker’s industry. The wage equation esti-
mates show that greater risk of sexual harass-
ment is associated with a statistically significant 
wage premium. Women employed in jobs with 
an average probability of sexual harassment are 
paid a compensating differential of 25 cents per 
hour relative to comparable women employed 
in jobs with no risk of sexual harassment. Men 
employed in jobs with an average probability of 
sexual harassment are paid a compensating dif-
ferential of 50 cents per hour relative to com-
parable men employed in jobs with no risk of 
sexual harassment.
I. Prevalence and Rates of Sexual Harassment
There are two categories of sexual harassment 
that are prohibited under Title VII. Sexual harass-
ment involving a tangible employment ben-
efit (“quid pro quo”) occurs when a supervisor 
requires sexual favors as a basis for employment 
decisions such as promotion or compensation. 
Hostile work environment sexual harassment 
does not involve a tangible employment benefit 
and includes behaviors such as coworkers who 
tell obscene jokes, make sexual suggestions or 
requests for sex, or routinely make demeaning 
comments about women’s ability to perform 
jobs because of their sex. The majority of sexual 
harassment litigation involves hostile work envi-
ronment discrimination. 
The measure of sexual harassment risk used 
in this paper is calculated using charges of 
sexual harassment filed with the EEOC or the 
corresponding state or local Fair Employment 
Practices Agency (FEPA). About 90,000 indi-
viduals file claims of employment discrimina-
tion annually. About 14,000 of these claims 
include allegations of sexual harassment. There 
are about 150 million individuals in the labor 
force, so clearly few workers file legal charges 
of discrimination generally or of sexual harass-
ment. But this does not mean that sexual harass-
ment is rare. Generally employees who are 
sexually harassed must report such behavior 
to their employer, and the employer is given 
the opportunity to attempt to stop any sexually 
harassing behavior. If internal remedies have 
been exhausted and the harassment continues, 
victims of harassment can then file a charge 
with the EEOC or FEPA. The EEOC then inves-
tigates and attempts to resolve the claim without 
litigation. If the EEOC is unable to successfully 
conciliate the case, the EEOC may bring suit in 
federal court or, more commonly, issue a “right 
to sue” notice to the charging party.
I calculate gender-specific estimates of the 
risk of sexual harassment by industry and age 
group.2 The numerators in this risk measure 
are the number of sexual harassment charges 
by industry, age group, and sex. The denomi-
nators are the corresponding levels of industry 
employment by age group and sex from the CPS (excluding self-employed workers who would 
generally not be able to claim sexual harassment 
against an employer). 
Because the sexual harassment rates are cal-
culated at the industry level, the biggest prob-
lem in calculating sexual harassment risk is 
missing data on industry codes in the EEOC 
claims data. Industry is not a required field on 
the EEOC claims records. Industry code is miss-
ing in about 28 percent of the claims prior to 
2006. According to an EEOC employee, missing 
data on industry became an even greater prob-
lem beginning in 2006 (for example, NAICS 
code is missing for 56 percent of the claims 
in 2008), in part because in 2006 the EEOC 
switched from SIC code to NAICS code and the 
drop-down menu for NAICS code was harder 
to use. For claims filed prior to 2006 with SIC 
code reported, the EEOC used a crosswalk to 
assign NAICS code. In addition, if the employer 
named in the claim could be linked to the EEO-1 
database (e.g., private firms with 100 or more 
employees or private federal contractors with 
50 or more employees), then the NAICS code 
reported in the EEO-1 form is transferred to 
the EEOC claims file. Thus, industry code is 
missing more frequently in smaller firms than 
in larger firms and is also missing far more fre-
quently starting in 2006 than in earlier years.
2 This follows the methodology used to construct fatality 
rates by industry, age, and sex in W. Kip Viscusi and Joni 
Hersch (2008). 
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The number of claims by industry, age group, 
and sex are used as the numerators in the cal-
culation of sexual harassment rates, so eliminat-
ing all observations with missing information, 
even if random, leads to lower sexual harass-
ment rates for an industry/age group/sex than 
are true. If industry code is missing at random, 
then we have classical measurement error in 
an explanatory variable in the regression equa-
tion, and the coefficient on this variable will be 
biased toward zero. A regression of an indica-
tor for missing industry on characteristics of 
claims shows that although there is some sys-
tematic variation in the probability that industry 
is recorded, observable characteristics explain 
fairly little of the variation in whether indus-
try is reported. Controlling for age group, sex, 
whether the claim was reported to the EEOC 
or FEPA, indicators of strength of claim (from 
definitely litigate to dismiss), firm size, institu-
tion type (e.g., private employer, educational 
institution), filing year, and race, the adjusted 
R2 is a very low 0.038 based on EEOC claims 
for the period FY 2000–FY 2004. Thus, while 
recognizing that the sexual harassment rate is 
measured with error, the low predictive power of 
observable characteristics suggests that assum-
ing the measurement error is largely random is 
not unreasonable.
Because the number of missing industry codes 
increased substantially after 2006, I use data 
from FY 2000–FY 2004 to calculate the numer-
ators in sexual harassment rate  calculation. 
There are 48,741 individual claims that include 
sexual harassment as an issue. Of these claims, 
42,065 are claims by women and 6,676 are 
claims by men. The denominators are based on 
employment data from the 2004 CPS excluding 
self-employed workers. The sexual harassment 
rates used in the wage equations are calculated 
by sex for two-digit industry (52 industries) and 
six age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 
55–64, and age 65 and older).
II. Patterns of Sexual Harassment Risk
Table 1 reports sexual harassment rates per 
100,000 workers by sex and major industry, as 
well as the percent female in the industry. The 
pattern across industries indicates that women 
are at a greater risk of sexual harassment in 
male-dominated industries, with the pairwise 
correlation between the female rate and percent 
female equal to −0.68 ( p = 0.01). The male 
rate is not correlated with the female rate; nor 
is the male rate correlated with percent female.
Figure 1 demonstrates the pattern of sexual 
harassment risk for women by age for four 
selected industries, which shows an inverted 
U-shaped pattern of risk of sexual harassment 
with age. The pattern is largely similar for the 
other industries. With the exception of mining, 
men also have an inverted U-shaped pattern of 
risk of sexual harassment with age. Men’s risk 
of sexual harassment is substantially below that 
of women at every age.
Table 1—Sexual Harassment Rates by Major Industry
Female Male Percent female
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 17.94 0.70 25.21
Mining 71.39 2.27 9.71
Construction 19.84 0.47 9.58
Manufacturing 15.65 1.25 30.86
Wholesale and retail trade 9.91 1.29 45.46
Transportation and utilities 17.24 1.21 24.48
Information 18.78 2.68 43.40
Financial activities 6.81 1.45 57.58
Professional and business services 13.98 1.83 43.16
Educational and health services 3.62 1.62 75.13
Leisure and hospitality 14.03 2.08 51.55
Other services 6.46 1.26 52.70
Public administration 16.42 2.17 45.94
Notes: Per 100,000 workers. Rates are calculated from EEOC Charge Data FY 2000–FY 2004 based on claims by individuals 
in which at least one issue was sexual harassment and in which industry is reported. Employment data calculated using 2004 
CPS.
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III. Wage Equations
I estimate conventional wage equations con-
trolling for sexual harassment risk and for other 
standard determinants of wages using CPS data 
for 2005. The dependent variable is the log of the 
hourly wage, which is either reported directly or 
calculated as weekly earnings divided by usual 
hours worked per week. In addition to the sex-
ual harassment rate, the explanatory variables 
are years of education and potential experi-
ence and its square, and indicator variables for 
occupation (management, business, financial; 
professional and related; healthcare support; 
protective service; food preparation and serv-
ing related; building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance; personal care and service; sales 
and related; office and administrative support; 
natural resources, construction, maintenance; 
and production, transportation, material mov-
ing), race (white; black; American Indian; 
Asian or Pacific Islander; or more than one race 
reported), Hispanic ethnicity, married, employed 
by the government, union member or covered by 
union contract, full time employment, metropol-
itan location, and region.
Because there is evidence that sexual harass-
ment is more prevalent in work settings with 
predominantly one sex, it is possible that any 
positive effect of sexual harassment for women 
reflects the higher pay associated with male-
dominated jobs. I also therefore control for 
the percent female in the individual’s narrowly 
defined (four-digit) industry. 
Table 2 summarizes the results with separate 
wage regressions estimated by sex, reporting 
only the coefficients on sexual harassment risk 
and percent female in the industry. The standard 
errors are clustered by industry and age group 
because all workers within the same industry 
and age group are assigned the same gender-
specific value for sexual harassment. For ease of 
interpretation, this table also reports mean pre-
dicted log wages estimated at the sample means 
of all variables and at the sample means of all 
variables assuming a zero sexual harassment 
rate. 
As expected, there is an inverse relation 
between the percent female in the industry and 
wages for both men and women. Both men and 
women receive a statistically significant wage 
premium for the risk of sexual harassment. The 
log wage difference between a job with zero 
sexual harassment risk and a job with the mean 
sexual harassment risk is 0.0155, or about 25 
cents per hour for women, and 0.0252, or about 
50 cents per hour for men. The large compensa-
tion for sexual harassment risk for men is sur-
prising. One possible explanation is that since 
men infrequently file sexual harassment claims, 
those claims that are filed are particularly egre-
gious, and exposure to such risk warrants a 
larger compensating differential than received 
by women.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Although illegal, sexual harassment occurs 
in the workplace. The risk of sexual harassment 
varies by sex, industry, and age. Women face far 
greater risk of sexual harassment than men in 
every industry and at every age, and women’s 
risk of sexual harassment is positively  correlated 
with the percent male in the industry. The risk 
of sexual harassment is highest for workers 
between ages 25 and 44. 
The central empirical issue addressed in this 
paper is whether sexual harassment lowers 
wages by reducing productivity or raises wages 
as workers require a compensating differential 
to incur this risk. Sexually harassing behaviors 
range from sexual looks or sexual jokes from 
coworkers to assault and rape, with surveys indi-
cating that sexual looks and comments are by 
far the most common type of workplace sexually 
harassing behavior. Because sexual harassment 
is costly for firms to eliminate, some forms of 
sexual harassment such as looks and comments 
that are hard to monitor may occur in the work-
place. This paper shows that, on balance, work-
ers receive a wage premium for exposure to the 
risk of sexual harassment in much the same way 
that workers receive a wage premium for the risk 
of fatality or injury. 
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